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Abstract. Many important system properties, particularly in security
and privacy, cannot be verified statically. Therefore, runtime verification
is an appealing alternative. Logics for hyperproperties, such as Hyper-
LTL, support a rich set of such properties. We first show that black-box
monitoring of HyperLTL is in general unfeasible, and suggest a gray-box
approach. Gray-box monitoring implies performing analysis of the system
at run-time, which brings new limitations to monitorabiliy (the feasibility
of solving the monitoring problem). Thus, as another contribution of this
paper we refine the classic notions of monitorability, both for trace prop-
erties and hyperproperties, taking into account the computability of the
monitor. We then apply our approach to monitor a privacy hyperproperty
called distributed data minimality, expressed as a HyperLTL property, by
using an SMT-based static verifier at runtime.
1 Introduction
Consider a confidentiality policy ϕ that requires that every pair of separate
executions of a system agree on the position of occurrences of some proposition a.
Otherwise, an external observer may learn some sensitive information about
the system. We are interested in studying how to build runtime monitors for
properties like ϕ, where the monitor receives independent executions of the system
under scrutiny and intend to determine whether or not the system satisfies the
property. While no such monitor can determine whether the system satisfies
ϕ—as it cannot determine whether it has observed the whole (possibly infinite)
set of traces—it may be able to detect violations. For example, if the monitor
receives finite executions t1 = {a}{}{}{a}{} and t2 = {a}{a}{}{}{a}, then it is
straightforward to see that the pair (t1, t2) violates ϕ (the traces do not agree on
the truth value of a in the second, fourth, and fifth positions).
Now, if we change the policy to ϕ′ requiring that for every execution there
must exist a different one that agrees with the first execution on the position of
? This is an extended version of a paper presented at the 23rd International Symposium
on Formal Methods (FM ’19). This version contains full proofs, a description of the
proof-of-concept monitor for DDM, and experimental results that were not included
in the original publication.
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occurrences of a, the monitor cannot even detect violations of ϕ′. Indeed, it is not
possible to tell at run-time whether or not for each execution (from a possibly
infinite set), there exists a related one. Such properties for which no monitor can
detect satifaction or violation are known as non-monitorable.
Monotorability was first defined in [27] as the problem of deciding whether
any extension of an observed trace would violate or satisfy a property expressed
in LTL. We call this notion semantic black-box monitorability. It is semantic
because it defines a decision problem (the existence of a satisfying or violating
trace extension) without requiring a corresponding decision procedure. In settings
like LTL the problem is decidable and the decision procedures are well-studied,
but in other settings, a property may be semantically monitorable even though
no algorithm to monitor it exists. This notion of monitorability is “black-box”
because it only considers the temporal logic formula to determine the plausibility
of an extended observation that violates or satisfies the formula. This is the
only sound assumption without looking inside the system. Many variants of this
definition followed, mostly for trace logics [19] (see also [5]).
The definition of semantic monitorability is extended in [1] to the context of
hyperproperties [11]. A hyperproperty is essentially a set of sets of traces, so mon-
itoring hyperproperties involves reasoning about multiple traces simultaneously.
The confidentiality example discussed above is a hyperproperty. The notion of
monitorability for hyperproperties in [1] also considers whether extensions of an
observed trace, or of other additional observed traces, would violate or satisfy
the property. An important drawback of these notions of monitorability is that
they completely ignore the role of the system being monitored and the possible
set of executions that it can exhibit to compute a verdict of a property.
trace/hyper
black/
gray
computability
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27]
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Fig. 1. The monitorability cube.
In this paper we consider a landscape of
monitorability aspects along three dimensions,
as depicted in Fig. 1. We explore the ability
of the monitor to reason about multiple traces
simultaneously (the trace/hyper dimension).
We first show that a large class of hyperprop-
erties that involve quantifier alternations are
non-monitorable. That is, no matter the ob-
servation, no verdict can ever be declared. We
then propose a solution based on a combina-
tion of static analysis and runtime verification.
If the analysis of the system is completely pre-
cise, we call it white-box monitoring. Black-box
monitoring refers to the classic approach of ignoring the system and crafting
general monitors that provide sound verdicts for every system. In gray-box mon-
itoring the monitor uses an approximate set of executions, given for example
as a model, in addition to the observed finite execution. The combination of
static analysis and runtime verification allows to monitor hyperproperties of
interest, but it involves reasoning about possible executions of the system (the
black/gray dimension in Fig. 1). This, in turn, forces us to consider the com-
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putability limitations of the monitors themselves as programs (the computability
dimension).
We apply this approach to monitoring a complex hyperproperty of interest
in privacy, namely, data minimization. The principle of data minimization (in-
troduced in Article 5 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation [15]) from
a software perspective requires that only data that is semantically used by a
program should be collected and processed. When data is collected from indepen-
dent sources, the property is called distributed data minimization (DDM) [4, 25].
Our approach for monitoring DDM is as follows. We focus on detecting violations
of DDM (which we express in HyperLTL using one quantifier alternation). We
then create a gray-box monitor that collects dynamically potential witnesses for
the existential part. The monitor then invokes an oracle (combining symbolic
execution trees and SMT solving) to soundly decide the universally quantified
inner sub-formula. Our approach is sound but approximated, so the monitor may
give an inconclusive answer, depending on the precision of the static verification.
Contributions. In summary, the contributions of this paper are the following:
(1) A novel richer definition of monitorability that considers monitors as com-
putable programs. For sufficiently rich programming languages, the classic
notion of semantically monitorability allows properties for which no monitor
can be built (Sect. 3).
(2) The combination of static analysis with runtime verification to enhance
monitors to be able to give a definitive answer, which allows to monitor,
for particular systems, properties that are not monitorable in a black-box
fashion. Our static verifier acts as an oracle aiding the runtime monitor to
reach a final verdict.
(3) We then express DDM as a hyperproperty and apply our technique to it
(Sect. 4). We have applied our proof-of-concept implementation to some
representative examples and present empirical evaluation (Sect. 5).
2 Background
Let AP be a finite set of atomic propositions and Σ = 2AP be the finite alphabet.
We call each element of Σ a letter (or an event). Throughout the paper, Σω
denotes the set of all infinite sequences (called traces) over Σ, and Σ∗ denotes the
set of all finite traces over Σ. For a trace t ∈ Σω (or t ∈ Σ∗), t[i] denotes the ith
element of t, where i ∈ N. We use |t| to denote the length (finite or infinite) of
trace t. Also, t[i, j] denotes the subtrace of t from position i up to and including
position j (or  if i > j or if i > |t|). In this manner t[0, i] denotes the prefix of t
up to and including i and t[i, ..] denotes the suffix of t from i (including i).
Given a set X, we use P(X) for the set of subsets of X and Pfin(X) for the
set of finite subsets of X. Let u be a finite trace and t a finite or infinite trace. We
denote the concatenation of u and t by ut. Also, u  t denotes the fact that u is
a prefix of t. Given a finite set of finite traces U and an arbitrary set W of finite
or infinite traces, we say that W extends U if every trace in U is a prefix of some
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trace in W . In this case, we write U W , which holds whenever for all u ∈ U ,
there is a v ∈ W such that u  v. Note that every trace in U is extended by
some trace in W (we call these trace extensions), and that W may also contain
additional traces with no prefix in U (we call these set extensions).
2.1 LTL and HyperLTL
We now briefly introduce LTL and HyperLTL. The syntax of LTL [26] is:
ϕ ::= a
∣∣¬ϕ ∣∣ ϕ ∨ ϕ ∣∣Ωϕ ∣∣ ϕ U ϕ
where a ∈ AP. The semantics of LTL is given by associating to a formula the set
of traces t ∈ Σω that it accepts:
t |= p iff p ∈ t[0]
t |= ¬ϕ iff t 6|= ϕ
t |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff t |= ϕ1 or t |= ϕ2
t |= Ωϕ iff t[1, ..] |= ϕ
t |= ϕ1 U ϕ2 iff for some i, t[i, ..] |= ϕ2 and for all j < i, t[j, ..] |= ϕ1
We will also use the usual derived operators (Ψϕ ≡ true U ϕ) and (Φϕ ≡ ¬Ψ¬ϕ).
All properties expressible in LTL are trace properties (each individual trace
satisfies the property or not, independently of any other trace). Some important
properties, such as information-flow security policies (including confidentiality,
integrity, and secrecy), cannot be expressed as trace properties but require reason-
ing about two (or more) independent executions (perhaps from different inputs)
simultaneously. Such properties are called hyperproperties [11]. HyperLTL [12]
is a temporal logic for hyperproperties that extends LTL by allowing explicit
quantification over execution traces. The syntax of HyperLTL is:
ϕ ::= ∀pi.ϕ ∣∣ ∃pi.ϕ ∣∣ ψ ψ ::= api ∣∣¬ψ ∣∣ ψ ∨ ψ ∣∣Ωψ ∣∣ ψ U ψ
A trace assignment Π : V → Σω is a partial function mapping trace variables to
infinite traces. We use Π∅ to denote the empty assignment, and Π[pi → t] for
the same function as Π, except that pi is mapped to trace t. The semantics of
HyperLTL is defined by associating formulas with pairs (T,Π) where T is a set
of traces and Π is a trace assignment:
T,Π |= ∀pi.ϕ iff for all t ∈ T the following holds T,Π[pi → t] |= ϕ
T,Π |= ∃pi.ϕ iff there exists t ∈ T such that T,Π[pi → t] |= ϕ
T,Π |= ψ iff Π |= ψ
The semantics of the temporal inner formulas is defined in terms of the traces
associated with each path (here Π[i, ..] denotes the map that assigns pi to t[i, ..]
if Π(pi) = t):
Π |= api iff a ∈ Π(pi)[0]
Π |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff Π |= ψ1 or Π |= ψ2
Π |= ¬ψ iff Π 6|= ψ
Π |= Ωψ iff Π[1..] |= ψ
Π |= ψ1 U ψ2 iff for some i, Π[i, ..] |= ψ2, and for all j < i T,Π[j, ..] |= ψ1
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We say that a set T of traces satisfies a HyperLTL formula ϕ (denoted T |= ϕ) if
and only if T,Π∅ |= ϕ.
Example 1. Consider the HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∀pi.∀pi′.Φ(api ↔ api′) and
T = {t1, t2, t3}, where t1 = {a, b}{a, b}{}{b} · · · , t2 = {a}{a}{b} · · · and t3 =
{}{a}{b} · · · Although traces t1 and t2 together may satisfy ϕ, t3 does not agree
with the other two, i.e., a ∈ t1(0), a ∈ t2(0), but a /∈ t3(0). Hence, T 6|= ϕ.
2.2 Semantic Monitorability
Runtime verification (RV) is concerned with (1) generating a monitor from a
formal specification ϕ, and (2) using the monitor to detect whether or not ϕ holds
by observing events generated by the system at run time. Monitorability refers to
the possibility of monitoring a property. Some properties are non-monitorable
because no finite observation can lead to a conclusive verdict. We now present
some abstract definitions to encompass previous notions of monitorability in a
general way:
– Observation. We refer to the finite information provided dynamically to
the monitor up to a given instant as an observation. We use O and P
to denote individual observations and O to denote the set of all possible
observations, equipped with an operator O  P that captures the extension
of an observation.
– System behavior. We use B to denote the universe of all possible behaviors
of a system. A behavior B ∈ B may, in general, be an infinite piece of
information. By abuse of notation, O  B denotes the observation O ∈ O
can be extended to a behavior B.
Example 2. When monitoring trace properties such as LTL, we have O = Σ∗,
an observation is a finite trace O ∈ Σ∗, O  O′ is the prefix relation on finite
strings, and B = Σω. When monitoring hyperproperties such as HyperLTL, an
observation is a finite set of finite traces O ⊂ Σ∗, that is, O = Pfin(Σ∗). The
relation  is the prefix for finite sets of finite traces defined above. That is, O  P
whenever for all t ∈ O there is a t′ ∈ P such that t  t′. Finally, B = P(Σω).
We say that an observation O ∈ O permanently satisfies a formula ϕ, if every
B ∈ B that extends O satisfies ϕ:
O |=s ϕ iff for all B ∈ B such that O  B, B |= ϕ
where |= denotes the satisfaction relation in the semantics of the logic. Similarly,
we say that an observation O ∈ O permanently violates a formula ϕ, if every
extension B ∈ B violates ϕ:
O |=v ϕ iff for all B ∈ B such that O  B, B 6|= ϕ
Monitoring a system for satisfaction (or violation) of a formula ϕ is to decide
whether a finite observation permanently satisfies (resp. violates) ϕ.
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Definition 1 (Semantic Monitorability). A formula ϕ is (semantically) mon-
itorable if every observation O has an extended observation P  O, such that
P |=s ϕ or P |=v ϕ.
A similar definition of monitorability only for satisfaction or only for violation
can be obtained by considering only P |=s ϕ or only P |=v ϕ. Instantiating this
definition of monitorability for LTL and finite traces as observations (O = Σ∗ and
B = Σω) leads to the classic definitions of monitorability for LTL by Pnueli and
Zaks [27] (see also [19]). Similarly, instantiating the definitions for HyperLTL and
observations as finite sets of finite traces leads to monitorability as introduced by
Agrawal and Bonakdarpour [1].
Example 3. The LTL formula ΦΨp is not (semantically) monitorable since it
requires an infinite-length observation, while formulas Φp and Ψp are monitorable.
Similarly, ∀pi.∀pi.Φ(api ↔ ¬api′) is monitorable, but ∀pi.∃pi.Φ(api ↔ ¬api′) is not,
as it requires an observation set of infinite size. We will prove this claim in detail
in Sect. 3.
3 The Notion of Gray-box Monitoring
Most of the previous definitions of monitorability make certain assumptions:
(1) the logics are trace logics, i.e. do not cover hyperproperties, (2) the system
under analysis is black-box in the sense that every further observation is possible,
(3) the logics are tractable, in that the decision problems of satisfiability, liveness,
etc. are decidable. We present here a more general notion of monitorability by
challenging these assumptions.
3.1 The Limitations of Monitoring Hyperproperties
Earlier work on monitoring hyperproperties is restricted to the quantifier alter-
nation-free fragment, that is either ∀∗.ψ or ∃∗.ψ properties. We establish now an
impossibility result about the monitorability of formulas of the form ∀pi.∃pi′.ΦF ,
where F is a state predicate. That is, F is formed by atomic propositions, api or
api′ and Boolean combinations thereof, and can be evaluated given two valuations
of the propositions from AP, one from each path pi and pi′ at the current position.
For example, the predicate F = (api ↔ ¬api′) for AP = {a} depends on the
valuation of a at the the first state of paths pi and pi′. We use v and v′ in F (v, v′)
to denote that F uses two copies of the variables v (one copy from pi and another
from pi′). A predicate F is reflexive if for all valuations v ∈ 2AP, F (v, v) is true.
A predicate F is serial if, for all v, there is a v′ such that F (v, v′) is true.
Theorem 1. A HyperLTL formula of the form ψ = ∀pi.∃pi′.ΦF is non-monitorable
if and only if F is non-reflexive and serial.
Proof. Let ϕ be ∀pi∃pi′.ΦF . We first observe that if F is serial, then the universal
set Σω is a model of ϕ, i.e. Σω |= ϕ. We show the two directions separately.
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– “⇐”. Assume that F is non-reflexive and serial, and let U be an arbitrary
observation. We show an infinite extension of U that violates ϕ and another
infinite extension of U that satisfies ϕ, concluding that no observation has
a finite extension that permanently satisfies or violates ϕ, that is, ϕ is not
monitorable. As mentioned above, since F is serial, Σω is a model of ϕ
and Σω extends U . Now, assume that all traces in U have the same length
(otherwise, extend the shorter traces arbitrarily). Then, pick v such that
F (v, v) is false (recall that F is non-reflexive so such a v must exist), and
consider the set of infinite observations V = {uvt | u ∈ U, t ∈ Σω}. Since v
appears at the same position in all strings in B, it follows that B 6|= ϕ.
– “⇒”. If F is reflexive then ϕ holds for every non-empty set of infinite words
by picking the same trace for pi and pi′. Therefore ϕ is monitorable (in
fact, guaranteed to be permanently satisfied for any observation). Otherwise,
assume that F is not serial, so for some v and for all v′, F (v, v′) is false.
Consider an arbitrary observation U and extend one u ∈ U into uv. The
observation obtained permanently violates ϕ because taking pi to be uv
cannot be matched at the position where v occurs by any trace for pi′.
This finishes the proof. uunionsq
The fragment of ∀∃ properties captured by Theorem 1 is very general. First,
the temporal operator is just safety (the result can be generalized for richer
temporal formulas). Also, every binary predicate can be turned into a non-reflexive
predicate by distinguishing the traces being related. Moroever, many relational
properties, such as non-interference and DDM, contain a tacit assumption that
only distinct traces are being related. Seriality simply establishes that F cannot
be falsified by only observing the local valuation of one of the traces. Intuitively,
a predicate that is not serial can be falsified by looking only at one of the traces,
so the property is not a proper hyperproperty. The practical consequence of
Theorem 1 is that many hyperproperties involving one quantifier alternation
cannot be monitored.
3.2 Gray-box Monitoring. Sound and Perfect Monitors
To overcome the negative non-monitorability result, we exploit knowledge about
the set of traces that the system can produce (gray-box or white-box monitor-
ing). Given a system that can produce the set of system behaviors S ⊆ B, we
parametrize the notions of permanent satisfaction and permanent violation to
consider only behaviors in S:
O |=sS ϕ iff for all B ∈ S such that O  B, B |= ϕ
O |=vS ϕ iff for all B ∈ S such that O  B, B 6|= ϕ
Considering these definitions, monitors must now analyze and decide properties
of extended observations which is computationally not possible for sufficiently
rich system descriptions. We therefore introduce a novel notion of monitor that
7
considers S and the computational power of monitors (the diagonal dimension in
Fig. 1).
A monitor for a property ϕ and a set of traces S is a computable function
M : O → {>,⊥, ?} that, given a finite observation O, decides a verdict for ϕ: >
indicates success, ⊥ indicates failure, and ? indicates that the monitor cannot
declare a definite verdict given only u. The following definition captures when a
monitor for a property ϕ can give a definite answer.
Definition 2 (Sound monitor). Given a property ϕ and a set of behaviors S,
a monitor M is sound whenever, for every observation O ∈ O,
1. if O |=sS ϕ, then M(O) = > or M(O) = ?,
2. if O |=vS ϕ, then M(O) = ⊥ or M(O) = ?,
3. otherwise M(O) = ?.
If a monitor is not sound then it is possible that an extension of O forces M to
change a > to a ⊥ verdict, or vice-versa. The function that always outputs ? is
a sound monitor for any property, but this is the least informative monitor. A
perfect monitor precisely outputs whether satisfaction or violation is inevitable,
which is the most informative monitor.
Definition 3 (Perfect Monitor). Given a property ϕ and a set of traces S, a
monitor M is perfect whenever, for every observation O ∈ O,
1. if O |=sS ϕ then M(O) = >,
2. if O |=vS ϕ then M(O) = ⊥,
3. otherwise M(O) = ?.
Obviously, a perfect monitor is sound. Similar definitions of perfect monitor only
for satisfaction (resp. violation) can be given by forcing the precise outcome only
for satisfaction (resp. violation).
A black-box monitor is one where every behavior is potentially possible, that
is S = B. If the monitor uses information about the actual system, then we say it
is gray-box. White-box refers to the ability to reason with absolute precision about
the set of traces of the system, while gray-box allows for approximate behaviors.
In some cases, for example to decide instantiations of a ∀ quantifier, a satisfaction
verdict that is taken from S can be concluded for all over-approximations (dually
under-approximations for violation and for ∃). For space limitations, we do not
give the formal details here.
Using Defs. 2 and 3, we can add the computability aspect to capture a stronger
definition of monitorability. Abusing notation, we use O ∈ S to say that the
observation O can be extended to a trace allowed by the system.
Definition 4 (Strong Monitorability). A property ϕ is strongly monitorable
for a system S whenever there is a sound monitorM such that, for all observations
O ∈ O, there is an extended observation P ∈ S, such that either M(P ) = > or
M(P ) = ⊥.
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A property is monitorable for satisfaction if the extension with M(P ) = >
always exists (and analogously for violation). In what follows we will use the
term monitorability to refer to strong monitorability whenever no confusion may
arise. It is easy to see that if a property is not semantically monitorable, then it
is not strong monitorable, but in rich domains, some semantically monitorable
properties may not be strong monitorable.
Lemma 1. If ϕ is strongly monitorable then ϕ is semantically monitorable.
A property may not be monitorable in a black-box manner, but monitorable
in a gray-box manner. In the realm of monitoring of LTL properties, strong
and semantic monitorability coincide for finite state systems (see [28]), because
model-checking and the problem of deciding whether a state of a Büchi automaton
is live are decidable.
4 Monitoring Distributed Data Minimality
In this section we describe how to monitor DDM, which can be expressed as a
hyperproperty of the form ∀+∃+. The negative non-monitotabiliy result from
Sect. 3.1 can be generalized to ∀+∃+ hyperproperties. In the particular case
of DDM, although we mainly deal with the input/output relation of functions
and are not concerned with infinite temporal behavior, we still need to handle
possibly infinite set extensions S for black-box monitoring. In the remainder of
this section, we discuss the following, seemingly contradictory aspects of DDM:
– DDM is not semantically black-box monitorable,
– DDM is semantically white-box monitorable (for programs that are not DDM),
– checking DDM statically is undecidable,
– no perfect monitor exists for DDM for a general system,
– DDM is strongly gray-box monitorable for violation, and we give a sound
monitor.
The apparent contradictions are resolved by careful analysis of DDM along the
different dimensions of the monitorability cube (Fig. 1).
We will show how to monitor DDM and similar hyperproperties using a gray-
box approach. In our approach, a monitor can decide at run time the existence
of traces using a limited form of static analysis. The static analyzer receives the
finite observation O collected by the monitor, but not the future system behavior.
Instead it must reason under the assumption that any system behavior in S that
is compatible with O, may eventually occur. For example, given an ∃∀ formula,
the outer existential quantifier is instantiated with a concrete set U of runtime
traces, while possible extensions of U provided by static analysis can be used to
instantiate the inner universal quantifier.
4.1 DDM Preliminaries
We briefly recapitulate the formal notion of data-minimality from [4]. A function
f : I → O is monolithic data-minimal (MDM), if it fulfills either of the following
equivalent conditions:
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1. the only preprocessor function p : I → I that can be applied to the inputs of
f without changing its outputs is the identity function;4
2. f is injective.
Condition 1. is an information-flow-based characterization that can be generalized
to more complicated settings in a straightforward fashion. Condition 2. is a purely
logical or data-based characterization more suitable for implementation in e.g. a
monitor.
MDM is the strongest form of data minimality, where one assumes that all
input data is provided by a single source and thus a single preprocessor can be
used to minimize the function. If inputs are provided by multiple sources (called
a distributed setting) and access to the system implementing f is restricted, it
might be impossible to use a single preprocessor. For example, consider a web-
based auction system that accepts bids from n bidders, represented by distinct
input domains I1, . . . , In, and where concrete bids xi ∈ Ii are submitted remotely.
The auction system must compute the function m(x1, . . . , xn) = maxi{xi}, which
is clearly non-injective and, hence, non-MDM. In this case, a single, monolithic
minimizer cannot be used since different bidders need not have any knowledge of
each other’s bids. Instead, bidders must try to minimize the information contained
in their bid locally, in a distributed way, before submitting it to the auction.
The problem of distributed data minimization consists in building a collection
p1, . . . , pn of n independent preprocessors for a function f . Then, one can gener-
alize the (information-flow) notion of data-minimality to the distributed setting
as follows. The function f is distributed data-minimal (DDM) if, for every input
xi, the only possible preprocessor pi is the identity function. Returning to our
example, the maximum function m defined above is DDM. As for MDM, there is
an equivalent, data-based characterization of DDM defined next.
Definition 5 (distributed data minimality [4]). A function f is distributed
data-minimal (DDM) if, for all input positions k and all x, y ∈ Ik such that
x 6= y, there is some z ∈ I such that f(z[k 7→ x]) 6= f(z[k 7→ y]).
We use Def. 5 to explore how to monitor DDM. In the following, we assume that
the function f : I1 × · · · × In → O has at least two arguments (n ≥ 2). Note that
for unary functions, DDM coincides with MDM. Since MDM is a ∀+-property
(involving no quantifier alternations), most of the challenges to monitorability
discussed here do not apply [25]. We also assume, without loss of generality, that
the function f being monitored has only nontrivial input domains, i.e. |Ii| ≥ 2 for
all i = 1, . . . n. If Ii is trivial then this constant input can be ignored. Finally, note
that checking DDM statically is undecidable for sufficiently rich programming
languages [4].
4.2 DDM as a Hyperproperty
We consider data-minimality for total functions f : I → O. Our alphabet, or set
of events, is the set of possible input-output (I/O) pairs of f , i.e. Σf = I × O.
4 To be considered a preprocessor, p needs to fulfill additional conditions, cf. [4].
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Since a single I/O pair u ∈ Σf captures an entire run of f , we restrict ourselves
to observing singleton traces, i.e. traces of length |u| = 1. In other words, we
ignore any temporal aspects associated with the computation of f . This allows
us to use first-order predicate logic—without any temporal modalities—as our
specification logic.
DDM is a hyperproperty, expressed as a predicate over sets of traces, even
though the traces are I/O pairs. The set of observable behaviors Of of a given
f consists of all finite sets of I/O pairs Of = Pfin(Σf ). The set of all possible
system behaviors Bf = P(Σf ) additionally includes infinite sets of I/O pairs.
We now express DDM as a hyperproperty, using HyperLTL, but with only
state predicates (no temporal operators). Given a tuple x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), we
write proji(x) or simply xi for its i-th projection. Given an I/O pair u = (x, y)
we use uin for the input component and uout for the output component (that is
uin = x and uout = y). Given trace variables pi, pi′, we define
output(pi, pi′) def= piout = pi′out pi and pi
′ agree on their output,
samei(pi, pi
′) def= proji(piin) = proji(pi
′
in) pi and pi
′ agree on their i-th input,
almosti(pi, pi
′) def=
∧
k 6=i
projk(piin) = projk(pi
′
in) pi and pi
′ agree on all but the i-th input
Then, we define DDM for input argument i as follows:
ϕi = ∀pi.∀pi′.∃τ.∃τ ′. ¬ samei(pi, pi′)→
(
samei(pi, τ) ∧ samei(pi′, τ ′) ∧
almosti(τ, τ
′) ∧ ¬ output(τ, τ ′)
)
In words: given any pair of traces pi and pi′, if piin and pi′in differ in their i-th
position, then there must be some common values z for the remaining inputs, such
that the outputs of f for τin = z[i 7→ proji(piin)] and τ ′in = z[i 7→ proji(pi′in)] differ.
Note that z does not appear in ϕi directly, instead it is determined implicitly by
the (existentially quantified) traces τ and τ ′. Finally, distributed data minimality
for f is defined as ϕdm =
∧n
i=1 ϕi.
Note that ϕdm follows the same structure as the logical characterization of
DDM from Sect. 4.1. The universally quantified variables range over the possible
inputs at position i, while the existentially quantified variables τ and τ ′ range
over the other inputs and the outputs. Note also that, given the input coordinates
of pi, pi′, and τ , all the output coordinates, as well as the input coordinates of τ ′,
are uniquely determined.5
4.3 Properties of DDM
Since ϕdm is a ∀+∃+ property, it should not come as a surprise that it is not
semantically black-box monitorable in general.
5 For simplicity, even though ϕdm is not in prenex normal form, it is a finite conjunction
of ∀∀∃∃ formulas in prenex normal form so a finite number of monitors can be built
and executed in parallel, one per input argument.
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Lemma 2 (black-box non-monitorability). Assume f : I → O, then ϕdm is
semantically black-box monitorable iff I is finite.
Proof. We first treat the case where I is finite. Assume I and O each contain
at least two elements. Smaller I/O domains correspond to degenerate cases for
which semantic black-box monitorability is easy to show, so we omit them here.
Let U ⊆ O be a finite set of traces. We need to show that there is a finite
extension V  U that permanently satisfies or violates ϕdm. Pick V = Σf = I×O.
Clearly, this is the largest observation in O, so any property satisfied by V is
also permanently satisfied by V . Hence it suffices to show that V |=s ϕdm.
Let u, u′, w be arbitrary I/O pairs, o 6= o′ ∈ O a pair of distinct outputs,
and i an arbitrary input position. Define v = (win[i 7→ proji(uin)], o) and v′ =
(win[i 7→ proji(u′in), o′). Then u, u′ and v, v′ are all in V , and it is easy to check
that ϕi holds if the quantified variables are instantiated to these traces in the
given orders. In other words V |=s ϕi for all i, and hence V permanently satisfies
ϕdm.
Conversely, assume that I is infinite, and let U again be a finite set of traces.
To show that U neither permanently satisfies nor permanently violates ϕdm, it is
sufficient to exhibit a pair of extensions Ts, Tv  U that satisfy and violate ϕdm,
respectively. For Ts, we pick Ts = Σf = I ×O. By the same argument as given
above (for the finite case), we have Ts |=s ϕdm.
We have to work slightly harder to construct Tv. Since I is infinite but U is
finite, there must be an input position i and a pair of distinct elements x 6= x′ ∈ Ii
such that no trace in U has x or x′ as its i-th input. Pick some arbitrary trace
w ∈ Σf , and let v = w[i 7→ x] and v′ = w[i 7→ x′]. By construction, v, v′ /∈ U , so
Tv = U ∪ {v, v′} is a strict extension of U . To show that Tv does indeed violate
ϕdm, it is sufficient to show that Tv |=v ϕi. Pick v, v′ to instantiate pi and pi′.
Then proji(win) = x 6= x′ = proji(w′in) by construction, but there is no way to
instantiate τ and τ ′: since they have to agree with pi and pi′ on the i-th input
position, the only candidates are v and v′, but vout = v′out by construction. uunionsq
However, and perhaps more surprisingly, ϕdm is semantically white-box moni-
torable for violations. That is, if f is not DDM, there is hope to detect it.
To make this statement more precise, we first need to identify the set of
valid system behaviors Sf of f . We define Σ#f = {(i, o) | f(i) = o} to be the set
of I/O pairs that correspond to executions of f . Then Sf = P(Σ#f ) precisely
characterizes the set of valid system behaviors. With the extra information that
gray-box monitoring affords, we can make more precise claims about properties
like DDM: whether or not a property is monitorable may, for instance, depend
on whether the property actually holds for the system under scrutiny. Concretely,
for the case of DDM, we show the following.
Theorem 2. Given a function f : I → O, the formula ϕdm is semantically gray-
box monitorable in Sf if and only if either f is distributed non-minimal or the
input domain I is finite.
Theorem 2 follows from the following two auxiliary lemmas.
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Lemma 3 (semantic violation). If f is not DDM, then ϕdm is semantically
monitorable for violation (in Sf ).
Proof. Assume a finite set of traces U ∈ Sf . We need to show that there is a
finite extension V  U permitted by Sf that permanently violates ϕdm. First,
note that the task is trivial if I is finite: we simply pick V = Σ#f , i.e. the set of all
possible executions, which is also finite. The only finite extension of V permitted
by Sf is the complete set of traces Σ#f itself, and since f is not distributed
minimal, ϕdm cannot hold for Σ
#
f .
Assume instead that I is infinite. Since f is distributed non-minimal, there
must be some input position i and some pair of distinct inputs x 6= x′ ∈ Ii,
such that f(z[i 7→ x]) = f(z[i 7→ x′]) for any choice of z ∈ I. Let y = z[i 7→ x]
and y′ = z[i 7→ x′] for an arbitrary z ∈ I. Then any set W ∈ Sf that contains
the traces u = (y, f(y)) and u′ = (y′, f(y′)) violates ϕdm. To see this, assume
instead that W |=sSf ϕdm. Then there must be traces v, v′ ∈W that agree on all
but the i-th input, such that f(vin[i 7→ x]) 6= f(v′in[i 7→ x′]), thus contradicting
non-minimality of f . Hence, by picking V = U ∪ {u, u′}, we have V |=vf ϕdm. uunionsq
Lemma 4 (Semantic satisfaction). If f : I → O is DDM, then ϕdm is se-
mantic monitorable for satisfaction (in Sf ) if and only if I is finite.
Proof. First, if I is finite the result follows by picking V = Σ#f . Assume now
that f is distributed minimal, ϕdm is semantically monitorable for satisfaction,
and I is infinite. Let U ∈ Sf be some non-empty, finite set of traces with some
distinguished element u ∈ U . Since ϕdm is monitorable for satisfaction, there
must be a finite extension V  U that permanently satisfies ϕdm. To arrive at
a contradiction, it suffices to construct a finite extension W  V that does not
satisfy ϕdm.
Pick an input position i for which Ii is infinite. Such an i must exist because
otherwise I would be the Cartesian product of finite sets, and I is infinite by
assumption. Next, pick a pair of distinct element x 6= x′ ∈ Ii such that there are
no traces in V with x or x′ as their i-th input. Such x, x′ must also exist because
Ii is infinite but V is finite. Finally, pick an input position j 6= i, and a y ∈ Ij
such that y 6= projj(uin). Such a y must exist for Ij to be non-trivial.
Now let z = uin[i 7→ x], z′ = uin[i 7→ z′, j 7→ y] and w = (z, f(z)), w′ =
(z′, f(z′)). Then w and w′ are clearly valid traces, i.e. w,w′ ∈ Σ#f , but w,w′ /∈ V
since w and w′ have x and x′ as their i-th inputs, respectively. LetW = V ∪{w,w′}.
By construction, ¬ samei(pi, pi′) holds if we instantiate pi and pi′ to w and w′,
respectively, but there is no pair of traces v, v′ ∈W to instantiate τ, τ ′ in such a
way that samei(pi, τ), samei(pi′, τ ′) and almosti(τ, τ ′) all hold simultaneously. The
former force the choice τ 7→ w and τ ′ 7→ w′ but, by construction, projj(win) 6=
projj(w
′
in). Hence W 6|=s ϕdm and we arrive at a contradiction. uunionsq
Theorem 2 follows immediately from Lemmas 3 and 4.
Intuitively, Theorem 2 means that f cannot be monitored for satisfaction.
Note that the semantic monitorability property established by Theorem 2 is
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independent of whether we can actually decide DDM for the given f . We address
the question of strong monitorability later on in this section.
If I is finite, it is easy to strengthen Theorem 2 by providing a perfect monitor
Mdm for ϕdm. Since f is assumed to be a total function with a finite domain, we
can simply check the validity of ϕdm for every trace U ⊆ Σ#f and tabulate the
result. To do so, the ∃ and ∀ quantifiers in ϕdm can be converted into conjunctions
and disjunctions over U .
Corollary 1. For f : I → O with finite I, ϕdm is strongly monitorable in Sf .
If I is infinite, then ϕdm is not semantically monitorable for satisfaction, but we
can still hope to build a sound monitor for violation of ϕdm.
4.4 Building a Gray-box Monitor for DDM
In what follows, we assume a computable function capable of deciding DDM only
for some instances. This function, that we call oracle, will serve as the basis for a
sound monitor for DDM. This monitor will detect some, but not all, violations
of DDM when given sets of observed traces.
Given f : I1 × · · · × In → O, we define the predicate ϕf as
ϕf (i, x, y) = ∃z ∈ I. f(z[i 7→ x]) 6= f(z[i 7→ y]),
and assume a total computable function Nf,i : Ii × Ii → {>,⊥, ?} such that
Nf,i(x, y) =
{
> or ? if ϕf (i, x, y) holds,
⊥ or ? otherwise.
In our practical implementation, we extract ϕf (i, x, y) from f using symbolic
execution, and use an SMT solver to compute Nf,i(x, y). We now define a monitor
Mdm for ϕdm as follows:
Mdm(U) =

? if f(uin) 6= uout for some u ∈ U,
? if
∧n
i=1
∧
u,u′∈U Nf,i(proji(uin),proji(u
′
in)) 6= ⊥,
⊥ otherwise.
Intuitively, the monitor Mdm(U) checks the set of traces U for violations of DDM
by verifying two conditions: the first condition ensures the consistency of U ,
i.e. that every trace in U does in fact correspond to a valid execution of f ; the
second condition is necessary for U not to permanently violate ϕdm. Hence, if
it fails, U must permanently violate ϕdm. Since Nf,i is computable, so is Mdm.
Note Mdm never gives a positive verdict >. This is a consequence of the fact that,
by Lemma 4, for a general f DDM is not monitorable for satisfaction.
The second condition in the definition of Mdm is an approximation of ϕdm:
the universal quantifiers are replaced by conjunctions over the finite set of input
traces U , while the existential quantifiers are replaced by a single quantifier
ranging over all of Σ#f (not just U). This approximation is justified formally by
the following theorem.
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Theorem 3 (soundness). The monitor Mdm is sound. Formally,
1. U |=sSf ϕdm if Mdm(U) = >, and
2. U |=vSf ϕdm if Mdm(U) = ⊥.
Proof. The monitor never gives a > verdict, so the first half of the theorem
(satisfaction) holds vacuously. For the second part (violation), we have
Mdm(U) = ⊥ ⇔ U ∈ Sf ∧
∨n
i=1
∨
u,u′∈U Nf,i(proji(uin),proji(u
′
in)) = ⊥,
and ∨n
i=1
∨
u,u′∈U Nf,i(proji(uin),proji(u
′
in)) = ⊥
⇔ ∨i ∃u, u′ ∈ U.¬ϕf (i,proji(uin),proji(u′in))
⇔ ∨i ∃u, u′ ∈ U.∀z ∈ I. f(z[i 7→ proji(uin)]) = f(z[i 7→ proji(u′in)])
⇔ ∨i ∃u, u′ ∈ U.∀w ∈ Σ#f . f(win[i 7→ proji(uin)]) = f(win[i 7→ proji(u′in)])
⇒ ∀V ∈ Sf . U  V ⇒∨
i ∃u, u′ ∈ V.∀w ∈ V. f(win[i 7→ proji(u)]) = f(win[i 7→ proji(u′)])
⇔ U |=vSf ϕdm.
uunionsq
5 Implementation and Prototype
We have implemented the ideas described in Sect. 4 in a proof-of-concept monitor
for DDM called minion. The monitor is based on the symbolic execution API
and the SMT backend of the KeY deductive verification system [2, 20]. The KeY
API is used to extract logical characterizations of Java programs (their symbolic
execution trees), extends them to first-order formulas over sets of observed traces,
and check the result using state-of-the-art SMT solvers, such as the Z3 [22, 23].
The minion tool itself is written in the Scala programming language and provides
a simple command-line interface (CLI).
Before we describe minion in more detail, we introduce a running example
illustrating the principles of both monolithic and distributed data minimality.
For an example of monolithic data minimization, first consider the method rate
shown in Fig. 2. The purpose of this method is to compute the baseline rate to
be paid by the driver of a vehicle on a toll road. The rate depends on the time
of day and the number of passengers in the vehicle. The range of the output is
{56, 70, 72, 90}, and consequently the data processor does not need to know the
precise hour of the day, nor the exact number of passengers. A vehicle might pass
a toll station at any time between 9pm and 5am to be subject to a the higher
daytime rates (72, 90), and at any other time to benefit from the lower nighttime
rates (56, 70). Also, any vehicle occupied by three or more passengers is eligible to
20% carpool discount. Giving the actual hour and number of passengers violates
the principle of data minimality because more information than necessary is
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1 class Toll {
2 int rate(int hour, int passengers) {
3 int r; // standard rates:
4 if (hour >= 9 && hour <= 17) { r = 90; } // - daytime
5 else { r = 70; } // - nighttime
6 if (passengers > 2) { r = r - (r / 5); } // carpool: 20%
7 return r;
8 }
9 int max(int x, int y) {
10 if (x > y) { return x; } else { return y; }
11 }
12 int fee(int t1, int t2, int t3, int p) {
13 int r1 = rate(t1, p); // rates at each toll station
14 int r2 = rate(t2, p);
15 int r3 = rate(t3, p);
16 int f1 = max(r1, r2) * 4; // fees per road section
17 int f2 = max(r2, r3) * 7;
18 return f1 + f2; // total fee
19 }
20 }
21
Fig. 2. A program for computing the total fee of a trip on a toll road.
collected. Data minimization is the process of ensuring that the range of inputs
provided is reduced, such that different inputs result in different outputs.
In a distributed setting, the concept of minimization is more complex as
input data may be collected from multiple independent sources. Consider the
method fee in Fig. 2. This method computes the total fee for a trip on a toll
road, based on the hours at which a vehicle passes three consecutive toll stations,
and on the number of passengers in the vehicle. The overall fee depends on
the total time spent on the toll road, which is data collected from all three toll
stations. In particular, if a vehicle enters a section of the toll road during a
low-rate early morning hour, but fails to reach the next station before 9pm, the
driver will be charged the more expensive daytime rate for the entire section.
Achieving DDM requires to minimize each input parameter individually, which
is information collected at each individual toll station. A preprocessor or data
minimizer [4] located at any given toll station can easily minimize the individual
inputs (hour, passengers) at that station. But an individual minimizer cannot
guarantee minimization with respect to the overall fee since it has no information
about the input data collected at the other stations. DDM therefore constitutes
merely a “best effort” to minimize inputs given the inherently distributed nature
of the system.
When running minion on the fee method of the class Toll, the tool builds
first the symbolic execution tree. Then, the monitor reads and parses traces from
an input file or standard input. Whenever minion parses a new trace, it rechecks
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20, 22, 1, 1, 770
2 , 2, 3, 5, 616
9 , 10, 10, 4, 792
23, 0, 2, 5, 616
10, 11, 14, 1, 990
8, 10, 11, 1, 990
...
(a) unprocessed
0, 0, 0, 1, 770
0, 0, 0, 3, 616
9, 9, 9, 3, 792
0, 0, 0, 3, 616
9, 9, 9, 1, 990
0, 9, 9, 1, 990
...
(b) distributed minimal
20, 22, 1, 1, 770
2, 2, 3, 5, 616
9, 10, 10, 4, 792
2, 2, 3, 5, 616
14, 15, 15, 2, 990
14, 15, 15, 2, 990
...
(c) monolithic minimal
Fig. 3. Raw and minimized traces generated from Toll.java.
the entire set of traces read thus far for violation, thereby supporting both online
and offline monitoring. Traces are read from CSV files, where the number and
format of the inputs is determined automatically from the method signature.
Fig. 3 shows example traces for the fee method. Columns 1–4 correspond to
the parameters h1, h2, h3 and p, respectively, while column 5 contains the result
computed by fee for the given values.
By default, minion monitors traces for DDM. Thus, when processing the
traces given in Fig. 3a, it signals a violation after reading the second line because
fee(20, h2, h3, p) = fee(2, h2, h3, p) irrespective of the choice of h2, h3, and p. In
contrast, all traces listed in Fig. 3b are accepted by minion since they have been
preprocessed by a distributed minimizer. Alternatively, minion can be instructed
to monitor traces for monolithic data minimality (MDM) in which case a violation
is signaled when processing the last line of Fig. 3b, whereas all traces in Fig. 3c
are accepted.
5.1 Lazy vs. Eager Monitoring
Perhaps surprisingly, there are cases where minion will detect a violation of DDM
whereas it will not detect a violation of MDM. Consider the function f(x, y) = x.
Since f simply ignores its second argument, it is clearly neither distributed nor
monolithic minimal. When monitoring the pair of traces (1, 2, 1) and (3, 4, 3)
for DDM, minion detects a violation because f(x, 2) = f(x, 4) for any choice
of x. Note, however, that this situation does not appear among the observed
traces since the two values for y in the respective traces differ. The tool reports a
violation because a common value for x is found by our oracle when monitoring
for DDM. When monitoring for MDM minion does not detect the violation,
because in this case there is no need to invoke the oracle.
Whether or not this is the intended behavior of the monitor depends on
the assumption of whether the traces are collected from a program f or from
the combined program f ◦ p (p being a minimizer). In the latter case, some
combinations of inputs may never be observed as the inputs have been minimized.
On the other hand, if traces are not considered preprocessed, we may wish to
explore the behavior of f more exhaustively. For this purpose, minion can be
instructed to monitor a set of traces eagerly for MDM, resp. lazily for DDM. For
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1 class Div {
2 //@ requires x >= 0 && y > 0;
3 //@ ensures (\result * y <= x) && (\result * y < x + y);
4 int posDiv(int x, int y) {
5 int q = 0;
6 //@ maintaining (r >= 0) && (r + q * y == x);
7 //@ decreasing r;
8 for (int r = x; r >= y; ++q) { r -= y; }
9 return q;
10 }
11 }
Fig. 4. A naive division algorithm for positive integers.
the former, minion considers not just the observed traces, but any combination
of observed input values—even if that combination does not actually correspond
to an observed trace. For the latter, minion only considers combinations of inputs
originating from traces with the same result value. For example, for the pair of
input traces (1, 2, 1) and (3, 4, 3), minion is able to find a violation in eager MDM
mode since f(1, 2) = f(1, 4), but not in lazy DDM mode since f(1, 2) 6= f(3, 4).
5.2 Loops and loop Invariants
In our current implementation, we have only considered simple programs whose
control flow does not include loops or recursive calls. Monitoring programs with
loops for data minimality is more challenging, as illustrated by method posDiv
given in Fig. 4, which implements integer division by repeatedly subtracting y
from x and counting how many times this is possible. Our simple symbolic tree
method cannot extract a complete logical characterization of posDiv automatically.
Instead, we propose two options:
(i) to obtain an approximate characterization by unrolling the loop to a fixed
depth;
(ii) to annotate loop invariants, which allows KeY’s symbolic execution engine
to merge the different execution paths and give a complete characterization
of the method.
Both of these options are implemented in minion. In the first case, choosing large
values for unrolling leads to high symbolic execution times but lower values may
affect accuracy. If the number of loop iterations n at runtime remains below the
number of unrolls m, the resulting logical characterization is exact but if n > m
the characterization becomes an over-approximation and the the monitor may
fail to detect non-minimal traces6.
6 Indeed, it may not even detect inconsistent traces, i.e. traces where the expected
output differs from the actual output computed at runtime.
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These false negatives can be avoided by annotating loops with loop invariants,
shown in Fig. 4 using JML. This invariant specifies that at every loop iteration
the remainder r is positive and, when added to the iteration counter q times
the divisor y, equals the original dividend x. With this invariant, the symbolic
execution terminates quickly and without cutting off any branches, and minion
is able to extract a logical characterization for posDiv, which asserts that the
eventual result q of the method must satisfy the equation qy = x− r for some r
such that 0 ≤ r < y. This is sufficient to correctly monitor any traces generated
from posDiv for violation of DDM.
5.3 Performance evaluation
Symb. K1: random (s) K2: DDMin (s) K3: MDMin (s)
exec. (s) Eager Lazy E L Eager Lazy E L Eager Lazy E L
T1 30.9±1.5 0.6±0.2 0.6±0.1 ⊥ ⊥ 51.2±1.2 30.3±7.2 ? ? 0.9± 0.8 5.4±0.2 ⊥ ?
T2 9.2±0.7 0.4±0.1 0.4±0.0 ⊥ ⊥ 17.3±0.8 13.9±2.2 ? ? 17.3± 0.7 3.7±0.3 ? ?
CA 1.8±0.1 0.5±0.2 0.4±0.2 ⊥ ⊥ 19.2±2.0 14.8±1.7 ? ? 13.6± 5.4 3.6±0.1 ⊥? ?
LA 3.4±0.4 0.4±0.2 0.3±0.0 ⊥ ⊥ 136.6±37.1 3.7±0.3 ? ?
Table 1. Mean running times and verdicts of minion monitoring various methods.
We evaluated the performance of minion on a MacBook Pro with a 3.1 GHz
Intel Core i5 processor and 16 GB of memory, running macOS 10.14. The results
are summarized in Table 1. We run minion on four Java methods: the fee method
from Fig. 2 (T1), a variant of that method that computes the fee on a road with
only two toll stations instead of three (T2), as well as the CreditApp (CA) and
LoyaltyApp (LA) benchmarks introduced in [3].
Each method was monitored for DDM violation using three kinds of input
traces:
(K1) random input values that respect the input specifications of the methods;
(K2) traces from (K1) minimized using a distributed data minimizer (DDMin);
(K3) traces from (K1) minimized using a monolithic data minimizer (MDMin).
The traces shown in Fig. 3 are subsets of the inputs generated for T1. We
generated 10 instances of each kind, accounting for a total of 30 trace sets, each
containing exactly 100 traces.
Table 1 shows the mean running time and standard deviation in seconds, as
well as the verdicts produced by minion. The second column of the table reports
the time spent by the symbolic execution. T1 incurs in higher running times
because T1 features several multiply-nested branches. The remaining columns
report the execution times and verdict of the actual monitor.
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The performance of eager and lazy monitoring is similar on random (K1) inputs
because all cases have (finite) small input and output domains. As expected, the
verdicts for the DDMin (K2) traces are inconclusive since DDM is not monitorable
for satisfiability in general (by Lemma 4). Lazy monitoring does consistently
better than eager monitoring on DDMin (K2) inputs, though the differences are
relatively small for T1, T2 and CA because the ranges of these methods are small
(< 10 elements). There is a bigger difference for LA, where the range is larger.
The performance of lazy monitoring on MDMin traces (K1) is consistently
better than on DDMin traces (K2) because lazy DDM monitoring and MDM
monitoring coincide for MDMin traces (no SMT invocations are necessary). On
the other hand, the performance of eager monitoring for MDMin traces may
change drastically depending on whether or not the traces are also DDMin (which
need not be the case). If they are, then eager monitoring has the same performance
for MDMin traces as for DDMin traces. If they are not, the eager monitor might
detect a violation early in the input set, cutting the overall execution time.
6 Related Work
LTL Monitorability. Pnueli and Zaks [27] introduced monitorability as the
existence of extension of the observed traces that permanently satisfy or violate
an LTL property. It is known that the set of monitorable LTL properties is a
superset of the union of safety and co-safety properties [6, 7] and that it is also
a super set of the set of obligation properties [16, 17]. Havelund and Peled [19]
introduce a finer grain taxonomy distinguishing between always finitely satisfiable
(resp. refutable), and sometimes finitely satisfiable where only some prefixes are
required to be monitorable (for satisfaction). This is a new dimension in the
monitorability cube in Fig. 1 which we will study in the future. While all the
notions mentioned above ignore the system, predictive monitoring [28] considers
the traces allowed in a given finite state system.
Monitoring HyperLTL. Monitoring hyperproperties was first studied in [1],
which introduces the notion of monitorability for HyperLTL [13] and gives an
algorithm for a fragment of alternation-free HyperLTL. This is later generalized to
the full fragment of alternation-free formulas using formula rewriting in [10], which
can also monitor alternating formulas but only with respect to a fixed finite set of
finite traces. Finally, [18] proposes an automata-based algorithm for monitoring
HyperLTL, which also produces a monitoring verdict for alternating formulas,
but again for a fixed trace set. The complexity of monitoring different fragments
of HyperLTL was studied in detail in [8]. The idea of grey-box monitoring for
hyperproperties, as a means for handling non-monitoriable formulas, was first
proposed in [9].
Data minimization. A formal definition of data minimization and the con-
cept of data minimizer as a pre-processor appear in [4], which introduces the
monolithic and distributed cases. Minimality is closely related to information
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flow [14]. Malacaria et al. [21] present a symbolic execution-based verification
of non-interference security properties for the OpenSSL library. We have in this
paper focused on a version of distributed minimization which is not monitorable
in general. For stronger versions (cf. [4]), [25] shows that monitorability for
satisfaction is not possible, but it is for violation. This paper also introduces an
RV approach for similar safety hyperproperties for deterministic programs.
7 Conclusions
We have rephrased the notion of monitorability considering different dimensions,
namely (1) whether the monitoring is black-box or gray-box, (2) whether we
consider trace properties or hyperproperties, and (3) taking into account the
computatibility aspects of the monitor as a program. We showed that many
hyperproperties that involve quantifier alternation are non-monitorable in a
black-box manner and propose a technique that involves inspecting the behaviors
of the system. In turn, this forces to consider the computability limitations of
the monitor, which leads to a more general notion of monitorability.
We have considered distributed data minimality (DDM) and expressed this
property in HyperLTL, involving one quantifier alternation. We then presented a
methodology to monitor violations of DDM, based on a model extracted from
the program being monitored in the form of its symbolic execution tree, and an
SMT solver. We have a implemented a tool (minion) and applied it to a number
of representative examples to assess the feasibility of our approach.
As future work, we plan to extend the proposed methodology for other
hyperproperties, particularly in the concurrent and distributed setting. We are
also planning to use bounded model checking as our verifier at run-time by
combining over- and under-approximated methods to deal with universal and
existential quantifiers in HyperLTL formulas. Another interesting problem is
to apply gray-box monitoring for hyperproperties with real-valued signals (e.g.,
HyperSTL [24]).
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